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Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. EPA:
EPA's Need to Protect
Its Confidential Sources
Versus Its Duty to Disclose
Under the Freedom of Information Act
I. Introduction
On July 4, 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA)' "to establish a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clear
statutory language."2 Since FOIA's inception, it has been sub-
stantially amended twice. The first revision occurred in 1974
notwithstanding President Ford's veto. The second revision
occurred in 1986.1
The 1974 amendment to Exemption 7 exempts from dis-
closure investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes, or information which, if written, would be contained
in such records, if such disclosure created one of the six spe-
cific harms enumerated in the exemption.4 The 1974 version
1. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 383 (1966)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
2. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). The text of the Act is reprinted
in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK 1 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter
SOURCE BOOK].
For a complete list of all published and unpublished judicial opinions and law
review articles dealing with FOIA, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
TION CASE LIST (1988).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988). See infra note 20.
4. Exemption 7 as amended in 1974 provided:
[The Freedom of Information Act] does not apply to . . . investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that
the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudi-
cation, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) dis-
close the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record
compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelli-
1
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of Exemption 7 allowed an agency to withhold information
which, if publicly disclosed, would endanger ongoing investi-
gations or judicial proceedings, invade personal privacy, en-
danger confidential sources, reveal investigatory techniques,
or threaten the life or well-being of law enforcement agents.
5
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA),6 the pipeline service sought release
under FOIA of copies of certain of its own corporate records
that were provided to the EPA by a third party.' The EPA
refused to surrender the documents, invoking FOIA Exemp-
tion 7(A), which authorizes the withholding of information
compiled for law enforcement purposes when the production
thereof could reasonably be expected to interfere with en-
forcement proceedings.' The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, upheld the ruling of the
district court, which granted the EPA's motion for summary
judgment against the pipeline company's request for disclo-
sure of the documents.9
This note focuses on the EPA's use of Exemption 7 of
FOIA to protect against the premature disclosure of informa-
tion collected for law enforcement purposes. The courts, in
determining which information should be disclosed to crimi-
nal defendants, must strike a balance between a defendant's
right to disclosure and the government's need for confidential-
ity. Part II provides a brief summary of the EPA's disclosure
policy and an overview of the current Exemption 7 provision.
Part III analyzes the issues raised in Alyeska and the court's
decision. Part IV concludes that the EPA must receive the
maximum protection available under Exemption 7 in order to
effectively carry out its enforcement function.
gence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confiden-
tial source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) en-
danger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
Freedom of Information Act, ch. 502, § 2, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563-64 (1974) (current ver-
sion at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988)).
5. Id.
6. 856 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
7. Id. at 309-10.
8. Id. at 310.
9. Id. at 315.
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II. Background
A. EPA's Policy on Disclosure of Records
The EPA will make the fullest possible disclosure of
records1 "consistent with the rights of individuals to privacy,
the rights of persons in business information entitled to confi-
dential treatment, and the need for EPA to promote frank in-
ternal policy deliberations and to pursue its official activities
without undue disruption."11 All EPA records are available to
the public unless they are found to be exempt from the disclo-
sure requirements of FOIA.12 If a requested document con-
tains both exempt and nonexempt material, the exempt por-
tion of that material will be withheld by the EPA."3 If it is the
determination of the local EPA office that the material in
question is exempt14 from production under FOIA, the person
10.
The term "EPA record" or simply "record" means any document, writing,
photograph, sound or magnetic recording, drawing, or other similar thing by
which information has been preserved, from which the information can be
retrieved and copied, and over which EPA has possession or control. It may
include copies of the records of other Federal agencies . . . .The term in-
cludes informal writings (such as drafts and the like), and also includes infor-
mation preserved in a form which must be translated or deciphered by ma-
chine in order to be intelligible to humans. The term includes documents and
the like which were created or acquired by the EPA, its predecessors, its of-
ficers, and its employees by use of Government funds or in the course of
transacting official business. However, the term does not include materials
which are published by non-Federal organizations which are readily available
to the public, such as books, journals, and periodicals available through refer-
ence libraries, even if such materials are in the EPA's possession.
40 C.F.R. § 2.100(b) (1988).
11. 40 C.F.R. § 2.101(a) (1988). Business information means "any information
which pertains to the interests of any business, which was developed or acquired by
that business, and (except where the context otherwise requires) which is possessed
by EPA in record form." 40 C.F.R. § 2.201(c) (1988).
12. 40 C.F.R. § 2.101(b) (1988).
13. 40 C.F.R. § 2.103 (1988). The applicability of an exemption does not necessa-
rily mean that the record must or should be withheld. 40 C.F.R. § 2.118(b) (1988).
14. 40 C.F.R. § 2.118 (1988). The exemption categories are:
(a) 5 U.S.C. 552(b) establishes nine exclusive categories of matters which are
exempt from the mandatory disclosure requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552(a). No
request under 5 U.S.C. 552 for an existing, located record in EPA's posses-
sion shall be denied by any EPA office or employee unless the record con-
tains (or its disclosure would reveal) matters that are-
3
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requesting the documents may file an appeal with the General
Counsel.' 5 Once a petitioner has exhausted the internal ap-
peals process of the EPA, the petitioner may proceed to a fed-
(1) Specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order;
(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 U.S.C.
552(b)): Provided, That such statute:
(i) Requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or
(ii) Establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to par-
ticular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential... ;
(5) Interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency;
(6) Personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) (i) Records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but
only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records
or information: (A) Could reasonably be expected to interfere with en-
forcement proceedings; (B) Would deprive a person of a right to a fair
trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) Could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) Could rea-
sonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, in-
cluding a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private insti-
tution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the
case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency con-
ducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information
furnished by a confidential source; (E) Would disclose techniques and
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would
disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if
such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of
the law; or (F) Could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual;
(8) Contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
40 C.F.R. § 2.118 (1988).
15. For a detailed description of this appeal process, see 40 C.F.R. § 2.114-.117
(1988).
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eral district court and request a court order to compel disclo-
sure by the EPA.
B. Current Provisions of Exemption 7
When President Johnson first signed the Freedom of In-
formation Act into law, he wrote: "[N]o one should be able to
pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be re-
vealed without injury to public interest."'" In reality, it was
the belief of critics in the early 1970's that "the act had be-
come a 'freedom from information' law, and that the curtains
of secrecy still remain tightly drawn around the business of
our government."17 In 1974, Congress responded to this criti-
cism by passing an amendment to FOIA over President Ford's
veto.' s This legislation was again the subject of substantive
change in 1986.11 Under the current Exemption 7,20 an agency
can now withhold "records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes" if one of the six listed harms would
16. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 1.
17. Id. See also Nader, Freedom of Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5
HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1970).
18. See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 3.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988). See infra note 20.
20. The current Exemption 7 provides that the Freedom of Information Act does
not apply to:
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or informa-
tion (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement' proceed-
ings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the
identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confi-
dential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, infor-
mation furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would dis-
close guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such
disclosures could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or
(F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of
any individual ....
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988).
5
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occur or "could reasonably be expected" to occur.21 This stan-
dard of "reasonableness" was one of the central points ad-
dressed by the court of appeals in Alyeska 2 2
III. The Court of Appeals Decision
A. Facts
In the spring of 1969, a major oil field was discovered in
the North Slope of Alaska. In June of that same year, a con-
sortium owning the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company2 3 sub-
mitted an application to the Department of the Interior to
construct a pipeline for the transport of oil from the North
Slope to the lower forty-eight states.2 4 Alyeska now owns and
operates the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System which transports
unrefined liquid hydrocarbons produced on Alaska's North
Slope to Valdez, Alaska.26 At the Valdez terminal, Alyeska
maintains a ballast water treatment (BWT) facility where
water is removed from the holds of tankers awaiting loading.
The water is treated to remove grease, oil and aromatics
before being discharged into Valdez Bay. 6
Alyeska's BWT facility has been (and still is) the subject
of an EPA investigation regarding possible violations of envi-
ronmental laws.27 In January 1985, pursuant to its statutory
authority, the EPA submitted interrogatories to Alyeska con-
cerning the operation of its facility.2 Two months later,
Charles Hamel, a private citizen, gave notice to the EPA of
his intent to commence an action to enforce the terms of Aly-
eska's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
21. Id. In the current Exemption 7, only subsections 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F)
contain the new "could reasonably be expected to occur" language.
22. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
23. In 1968, Atlantic Richfield Co., Humble Oil and Refining Co., and British
Petroleum Corp. formed the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Service (Alyeska). Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 419 U.S. 823, 824 (1974).
24. Alyeska, 856 F.2d at 310.
25. Id. at 310.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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(NPDES) permit.2 9 Hamel informed the EPA that he had ob-
tained twenty-two documents from employees of Alyeska.
Hamel subsequently released these corporate records to the
EPA in order to expose alleged violations of federal environ-
mental laws on the part of the Alyeska Pipeline Service Com-
pany. Subsequently, the EPA ordered Alyeska to preserve
all of its records pertaining to its Valdez treatment facility. 3'
The EPA then issued two compliance orders to Alyeska
enumerating violations at the BWT facility and requiring Aly-
eska to correct them.32
In February 1986, Alyeska requested disclosure of the
documents given to the EPA by Hamel pursuant to FOIA. ss
The EPA located twenty-two responsive documents, compris-
ing approximately 177 pages, but withheld them.34 The EPA,
citing Exemption 7, refused to disclose the documents to Aly-
eska "because [the request was for] investigatory records com-
piled for law enforcement purposes the disclosure of which
would identify the confidential source of these documents and
investigative techniques and procedures."35 The EPA main-
tained that the documents related to an ongoing investigation
of Alyeska concerning possible violations of the Clean Water
Act,36 the Clean Air Act,37 the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act,3s and the Toxic Substances Control Act.39
Alyeska filed suit in the district court of the D.C. Circuit
29. Id. While the EPA advised the court of appeals that one facet of this investi-
gation had been completed, Alyeska still is faced with a citizen's suit under section
505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
30. Alyeska, 856 F.2d at 310.
31. Id.
32. Id. The first of these orders was issued in July and the second was issued
four months later in November 1985.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting letter from Ernesta B. Barnes to Maryann Armbrust (Feb. 13,
1986) (paraphrasing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988))).
36. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. EPA, No. 86-
2176, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds).
1989]
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in August 1986.0 On cross-motions for summary judgment,
the court held that the EPA's refusal to produce the re-
quested materials was justified by FOIA Exemption 7(A) be-
cause disclosure would interfere with the EPA's ongoing law
enforcement proceedings against Alyeska." The district court
further held that Alyeska was not entitled to a Vaughn in-
dex.42 The court concluded that giving Alyeska a list of the
records at issue would be equivalent to disclosing the records
in full.43
On appeal, Alyeska argued that summary judgment was
inappropriate since the parties' affidavits conflicted with re-
gard to whether disclosure could reasonably be expected to in-
terfere with the EPA's law enforcement proceeding. 4 Further,
Alyeska contended that the district court failed to examine
the agency's exemption claim de novo, as required by FOIA.45
B. The Burden of Proof
1. The First Prong of the Test
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision
and upheld the lower court's use of a two-prong test to deter-
mine whether the documents in the EPA's possession were
protected under Exemption 7. Under Exemption 7(A), the
EPA must first show that the documents at issue were com-
piled for law enforcement purposes and that the release of
these records would interfere with enforcement proceedings.46
The first of these two requirements, derived from Pratt v.
40. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 310 (D.D.C. Cir. 1988).
41. Id.
42. The term "Vaughn index" is derived from the case Vaughn v. Rosen, 484
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). A "Vaughn index" is a
list of documents that a party has in his possession and may use in a legal action
against the party wishing to have them disclosed. Id.
43. The court noted that Alyeska created the records at issue. Alyeska, 856 F.2d
at 311.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, No. 86-2176, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Sept. 9,
1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds).
[Vol. 7
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Webster,47 is referred to as the "threshold test."""
In Pratt, the court of appeals determined that FOIA
makes no distinction on its face between agencies whose prin-
cipal function is criminal law enforcement, and agencies with
both law enforcement and administrative functions. However,
the court found that it would be unnecessarily "wooden" to
treat both groups identically when they claim Exemption 7 as
a basis for withholding. 9
The EPA, a governmental agency whose primary purpose
is not criminal law enforcement,5" has the burden of proving
that the requested records were gathered for law enforcement
purposes. 51 If, however, the EPA is unable to satisfy this first
test, the information must be disclosed even if one of the six
specific harms listed in Exemption 7 will occur upon disclo-
sure. 52 This "threshold test," has created a situation in which
confidential informants may refrain from giving information
to the EPA because of the possibility of being exposed if the
information is deemed to have been gathered for administra-
tive, rather than law enforcement, purposes.5 "
2. The Second Prong of the Test
The court of appeal's affirmation of the lower court's de-
cision was largely based upon the affidavit of John Y. Hohn,
Assistant Regional Counsel for the EPA, Region 10.11 Hohn,
who had actively participated in the supervision of the EPA's
47. 673 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
48. Id. at 413.
49. Id. at 416.
50. The EPA was created to coordinate and effect governmental action to "as-
sure the protection of the environment by abating and controlling pollution on a sys-
tematic basis .... Complimentary to these activities are the Agency's coordination
and support of research and antipollution activities carried out by State and local
governments, private and public groups, individuals, and educational institutions." 40
C.F.R. § 1.3 (1989).
51. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
52. Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
53. For a full discussion of the possible crippling effect of the "threshold rule" as
applied to other governmental agencies, see Note, Threshold Requirements for the
FBI Under Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 86 MICH. L. REv. 620,
620-45 (1987).
54. Alyeska, 856 F.2d at 311-12.
1989]
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investigation of Alyeska, represented in his affidavit that the
EPA was conducting an ongoing investigation of Alyeska for
numerous alleged environmental violations.5 5 "Hohn averred
that during EPA's investigation, he engaged in 'detailed confi-
dential conversations with Mr. Hamel' e during which he 're-
quested that Mr. Hamel provide [Hohn] with documents that
pertained to specific allegations of statutory violations by Aly-
eska that would serve to substantiate portions of his
[Hamel's] notice of citizen's suit.' ,57
The district court concluded that the first of the two tests
was satisfied, since the plaintiff did not dispute the EPA's
claim that the documents related to an ongoing investigation
of alleged violations by Alyeska of the Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act.58 While Alyeska
was willing to concede that the threshold test was met, it still
asserted that the disclosure of the documents would not inter-
fere with law enforcement proceedings.5"
To meet the burden necessary to satisfy the second part
of the test, the district court required the EPA to show "by
more than conclusory statement[s], how disclosure would in-
terfere with a pending enforcement proceeding."6 The EPA
was required to present the court with specific examples and
explanations of the type of harm that would result from the
disclosure of the records."1 The EPA was not required to de-
scribe the possible risks involved in disclosing each document
requested. 62 Without objection from Alyeska, the EPA as-
55. Id. at 312.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, No. 86-2176, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Sept. 9,
1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds).
59. Id.
60. Id., citing Campbell v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.2d
256, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
61. Alyeska, No. 86-2176, slip op. at 3.
62. Id. at 3-4. The EPA may focus on categories of documents and show how
disclosure of each category could impede enforcement proceedings. Id. at 4, citing
Beavis v. Department of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Crooker v. Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 789 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Campbell v.
[Vol. 7
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serted that all twenty-two documents could be classified into
one general category."e
In the court of appeals, the burden was on the EPA to
show that this category of records, if disclosed, would inter-
fere with its ongoing investigation of Alyeska" 4 The EPA sug-
gested to the court two possible problems that could arise if
the documents were disclosed.
First, the Hohn affidavit 5 asserted that disclosure would
"prematurely reveal[] to the subject of the ongoing investiga-
tion the size, scope, and direction of this investigation. '6 The
court of appeals interpreted Hohn's affidavit to stand for the
proposition that because the materials given to the EPA were
selectively chosen, identification of the documents would re-
veal the particular types of allegedly illegal activities under
EPA investigation. In this instance, both the district court
and the court of appeals were satisfied that Alyeska was not
fully cognizant of the scope and focus of the EPA investiga-
tion and that the release of these documents could provide
great insight to Alyeska in this respect.
Second, the EPA stated its fear that the release of the
documents could allow Alyeska to trace them to the individ-
ual employees who relinquished them to Hamel. e8 Mr. Hohn
contended that such a disclosure would cause a loss of cooper-
ation from potential witnesses in EPA investigations.6 He felt
these witnesses could be subject to reprisals, while nonem-
ployee witnesses would not.70 Mr. Hohn repeatedly empha-
sized that "the employees who provided the records were
'fearful of financial and physical retribution from Alyeska if
their identities were discovered.' "71 Mr. Hohn concluded that
the release of the records at the time of this proceeding would
Department of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.2d 256, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
63. Alyeska, No. 86-2176, slip op. at 4.
64. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d at 311.
65. Affidavit of John Y. Hohn, Alyeska, No. 86-2176, slip op. at 4.
66. Alyeska, 856 F.2d at 312 (quoting Alyeska, No. 86-2176, slip op. at 4).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
1989]
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chill future investigations by discouraging witnesses from pro-
viding confidential information.72
In deciding whether or not the EPA had satisfied the sec-
ond prong of the disclosure test, the court of appeals noted
that "it is not enough for an agency to shore up its exemption
claim merely with general and conclusory statements regard-
ing the effect of disclosure."' "a Alyeska maintained that there
was no reason to suspect that they would engage in employee
harassment of any kind.74 In affirming the district court's
opinion, the court of appeals agreed that "it is not necessary
to show that intimidation will certainly result. ' 75 The defend-
ant instead must prove that the possibility of witness intimi-
dation exists. 6 In reaching its decision in favor of the EPA,
the court of appeals examined the Supreme Court's decision
in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. 77
In Robbins, an employer, charged with unfair labor prac-
tices and facing a pending hearing, requested copies of all
records that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had
received from potential witnesses. 78 The NLRB denied the re-
quest, claiming that this prehearing disclosure would interfere
with enforcement proceedings. 79 The NLRB's decision was
subsequently reviewed by the Supreme Court. In upholding
the NLRB's position, the Supreme Court noted that in creat-
ing Exemption 7, "Congress recognized that law enforcement
agencies had legitimate needs to keep certain records confi-
dential, lest the agencies be hindered in their investigations or
72. Id. For further examples of this potential chilling effect, see National Secur-
ity, Law Enforcement, and Business Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act,
38 Bus. LAW. 707, 708-12 (1982).
73. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
74. Id. at 311.
75. Id. (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Service v. EPA, No. 86-2176, slip op. at 4
(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds).
76. Id.
77. 437 U.S. 214 (1978). The Supreme Court stated: "The danger of witness in-
timidation is particularly acute with respect to current employees ... over whom the
employer, by virtue of the employment relationship, may exercise intense leverage."
Id. at 240.
78. Id. at 216.
79. Id. at 216-17.
[Vol. 7
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placed at a disadvantage when it came time to present their
cases." ' The Court further noted that "[tihe most obvious
risk of 'interference' with enforcement proceedings in this
context is that employers or, in some cases, unions will coerce
or intimidate employees and others who have given state-
ments, in an effort to make them change their testimony or
not to testify at all."81 The Supreme Court concluded that a
suspected violator with advance access to these records "could
construct defenses which would permit violations to go
unremedied. 82
The court of appeals, agreed with the rationale of the
Court in Robbins and concluded that the EPA had met its
burden of proof in establishing that Exemption 7(A) is broad
enough to intercept the documents in question in order to
protect the EPA's ongoing enforcement proceedings.8 3
C. The Motion for Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment may only be rendered
when it is shown that "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law." '84 "[W]hen the litigants quarrel over
key factual premises for a determination [of the probable con-
sequences of releasing particular information], we have un-
hesitatingly ruled that summary judgment is inappropriate."85
Alyeska contended that the court of appeals should deviate
from past precedent and create a doctrine that whenever the
parties' affidavits disagree on the probable consequences of a
80. Id. at 224.
81. Id. at 239.
82. Id. at 241 (quoting New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d
377, 382 (1st Cir. 1976)).
83. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
84. Id. at n.35 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) ("[tjhe judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and ad-
missions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.").
85. Alyeska, 856 F.2d at 313 (quoting Washington Post Co. v. Department of
State, 840 F.2d 26, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
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disclosure, summary judgment should be barred."' The court
of appeals correctly disregarded this request. "If FOIA parties
could routinely block summary judgment in this fashion,
many unmeritorious FOIA cases could not be disposed of
prior to a trial. '8 7
In the instant case, the affidavit submitted to the court
by Alyeska did not raise any dispute with the facts presented
in the affidavit submitted by the EPA. s The alleged conflict
purportedly arose from the Alyeska affidavit, submitted by
Ivan Henman, an Alyeska employee in charge of a task force
established by the company in direct response to the EPA in-
vestigation."9 It was Henman's position that Alyeska was
aware that its Valdez facility was under investigation by the
EPA, and that the disclosure of the records would not provide
Alyeska with any new insight in this regard.90 Henman argued
that through his company's interaction with the EPA over the
past three years, the scope of the agency's investigation had
been made clear as had the specific alleged violations of the
Clean Water Act.91
In reviewing Henman's affidavit, the court stated that "a
party's purported knowledge of the general scope of the inves-
tigation is a far cry from specific knowledge of the particular
activities being investigated and the direction being pur-
sued."92 The court noted that while it might concede that Aly-
eska is aware of the specific violations of the Clean Air Act of
which it is accused, the "EPA has made plain that its investi-
gation encompasses numerous other environmental statutes as
well."9" The court of appeals concluded that Henman's affida-
vit was nothing more than speculation94 and, therefore, was
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 314.
90. Id.
91. Id. Henman relied upon the EPA's previous requests for information (the
two compliance orders issued by the EPA in 1985, and the agency's interviews with
Alyeska employees) to substantiate his argument. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. ; see FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("[S]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be
[Vol. 7
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insufficient to raise a key factual question. 5
D. The EPA's Exemption Claim De Novo
Alyeska's final claim on appeal was that the district court
failed to consider de novo the EPA's exemption claim." Aly-
eska based this claim solely on the district court's remark that
"[t]he affidavits of a government agency in FOIA are to be
given substantial weight by a reviewing court. '9 7 Alyeska con-
tended that this comment was indicative of the lower court's
lack of scrutiny in reviewing the government's affidavits.98
The court of appeals rejected the claim and pointed out
that the lower court cited to two FOIA Exemption 1 cases in-
volving issues of national security in which the government's
affidavits were afforded substantial weight by the court.9 9 In
the instant case, the court of appeals concluded that the con-
tent of the government's affidavits was more than sufficient on
its face.' 0
IV. Conclusion
The court of appeals decision in Alyeska is indicative of
the judiciary's growing recognition that the EPA needs pro-
tection against mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act. Exemption 7 must be given great weight
when applied to the EPA if the agency is to be successful in
enforcing environmental laws. When interpreting FOIA,
courts must be vigilant against those who seek to have infor-
mation disclosed in order to avoid prosecution. An example of
such judicial vigilance is the court of appeals' decision that
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein."). Id. at n.45.
95. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
96. Id. at 315.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. For the text of these two decisions, see Hayden v. National Sec. Agency,
608 F.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); Gardels v.
CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
100. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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the EPA should be afforded the protection of Exemption 7 of
FOJA when the records gathered are to be used for law en-
forcement purposes.
Warren J. Roth
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